Apollo experience report:  Lunar module reaction control system by Vaughan, C. A. et al.
N A S A  TECHNICAL NOTE NASA TN D-6740 
0 * 
h 
m 
z c 
4 
c/I 
4 z 
Y 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - 
LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
by Chester A .  Vuughun, Robert Villemarette, 
Witulij Kdrukulko, and Donald R. Blevins 
Munned Spacecrufi Center 
Houston, Texus 77058 
N A T I O N A L  A E R O N A U T I C S  A N D  SPACE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  W A S H I N G T O N ,  D. C. M A R C H  1972 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19720014237 2020-03-23T11:01:13+00:00Z
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 
NASA 'I" D-6740 
4. Title and Subtitle 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
7. Author(s) 
Chester A. Vaughan, Robert Villemarette, 
Witalij Karakulko, and Donald R. Blevins, MSC 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C. 20546 
3. Rekipient's Catalog NO. 
5. Report Date 
6. Performing Organization Code 
March 1972 
8. Performing Organization Report No, 
MSC S-315 
1 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price 
None None 23 $3.00 
10. Work Unit No. 
914-1 1 -10-EP-72 
11. Contract or Grant No. 
13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
Technical Note 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
15. Supplementary Notes 
The MSC Director waived the use of the International System of Units (SI) for 
this Apollo Experience Report, because, in his judgment, use of SI Units would impair the usefulness 
of the report or result in excessive cost. 
16. Abstract 
The design, development, and qualification of the reaction control system for  the Apollo lunar 
module are described in this document. The lunar module reaction control system used many 
of the components developed and qualified for the service module reaction control system. The 
system was qualified for  manned flight during the unmanned Apollo 5 mission on January 22 
and 23, 1968, and has operated satisfactorily during all manned lunar module flights including 
Apollo 11, the first manned landing on the moon. 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 
* Rocket Engines - Propellant Systems 
* Attitude Control - Propellant Pressurization 
* Lunar Module * System Development 
- Apollo Experience * System Cleanliness Reaction Control * Spacecraft Propulsion 
~ ~~ 
18. Distribution Statement 
For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151 
CONTENTS 
Section Page 
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
5 
Installation of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
DEVELOPMENT AND CERTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
7 
8 
Flange Heater and P res su re  Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Preproduction System Development Test  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Production System Development Test  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Design Verification Development Test  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Production Cluster Environmental Test  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Lunar Module Production Cluster Firing Test Program . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Integrated RCS/APS PA-1 Test  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 
In-House LM RCS Test  Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 
Heater Integration Tes ts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 
Engine Valve Temperature Tes ts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  
15 LUNAR MODULE RCS CHECKOUT O F  FLIGHT VEHICLES . . . . . . . . . . .  
LUNAR MODULE RCS FLIGHT PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 
Lunar Module 1 (Apollo 5 Mission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
Lunar Module 3 (Apollo 9 Mission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
Lunar Module 4 (Apollo 10 Mission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
Lunar Module 5 (Apollo 11 Mission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
CONCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
iii 
FIGURES 
Figure Page 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 1 Apollo lunar module 
3 
4 
5 
6 
14 
2 Reaction control system installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Reaction control system schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
4 Propellant manifold and distribution system schematic . . . . . . . .  
5 Development and flight schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
6 Engine safe operating regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
3 
iv 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
By Chester A. Vaughan, Robert Vil lemarette, 
W i ta l i j  Karakulko, and Donald R. Blevins 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The lunar module reaction control system was patterned very closely after the 
service module reaction control system. Components common to the service module 
reaction control system and the lunar module reaction control system were used where 
possible. Where components could not be common, common technology was used in the 
development of the lunar module reaction control system. The experience gained from 
Gemini missions and the command and service module reaction control sys tems in the 
areas of system fabrication, checkout, and testing also w a s  applied to the lunar module 
reaction control system. The system reliability requirements were achieved through 
system and component redundancy. Two independent operational lunar module reaction 
control systems were provided. 
The development and certification consisted of nine major ground test programs : 
(1) preproduction system development, (2) production system development, (3) design 
verification development, (4) production cluster environment, (5) lunar module produc - 
tion cluster firing, (6) integrated reaction control system/ascent propulsion system 
PA-1, (7) the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center in-house lunar module reaction control 
system test ,  (8) heater integration, and (9) engine valve temperature.  
The checkout of the lunar module reaction control flight systems was divided into 
four basic categories of tes ts :  (1) component, (2) module, (3) system level, and (4) ve- 
hicle integration checkout. 
The performance of the lunar module reaction control system on Apollo missions 
was satisfactory. Several minor problems occurred, but solutions were found for all 
problems encountered. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The Apollo spacecraft is composed of the command module (CM), the service 
module (SM), and the lunar module (LM). In July 1961, the NASA Space Task Group 
released the first statement of work for the CM and the SM. Included in this statement 
of work was a description of the reaction control system (RCS). The experience gained 
during the initial development of the CM RCS and the SM RCS was applied in the develop- 
ment of the LM RCS; and, as a result, the qualification program was simplified greatly. 
This technical note is concerned only with the development and evolution of the LM RCS. 
REQU I REMENTS 
The Apollo missions required that the LM (fig. 1) maintain various attitudes with 
respect to its flight path and maneuver in three axes to achieve a successful manned 
lunar landing and return t o  the command and service module (CSM). Specifically, the 
LM was required to be stable during all phases of flight and to  have three axes of trans 
lation available for CSM separation, for CSM docking, and f o r  various translational 
maneuvers during the lunar-orbit rendezvous. In addition, X-axis longitudinal t rans-  
lation was required to  provide propellant-settling thrust  fo r  the descent and ascent pro- 
pulsion systems. 
Arcenl n 
Figure 1 .  - Apollo lunar module. 
A wide spectrum of operational re- 
quirements for  vehicles that varied in m a s s  
and moment of inertia by a factor of 10, cou- 
pled with the necessary vehicle accelera - 
tions, established a requirement fo r  rocket 
engines capable of producing high sustained 
thrust as well as low impulse. The initial 
design criteria were to  provide rocket en- 
gines of various t h r u s t  levels to satisfy the 
variety of requirements. However, a close 
examination of the rocket engine that w a s  
being developed fo r  the SM RCS revealed 
that the high thrust  and low total-impulse 
capabilities could satisfy all the transla- 
tional and rotational requirements of the 
LM mission. After this engine was select- 
ed, the remainder of the system was pat- 
terned very closely after the SM RCS; the 
differences were primarily in the propellant- 
load capability and system geometry as dictated by the requirements of the LM mission. 
The similarity was extended to the use of common components wherever possible. Be- 
cause of the common-use philosophy and the common-technology approach, component 
development and qualification testing for  the LM RCS were simplified greatly. 
The environmental constraints for  the LM RCS generally were less severe than 
those of the SM RCS; therefore, the experience gained with the SM components in the 
areas of vibration, shock, thermal vacuum, compatibility with propellant, and suscep- 
tibility to contamination could be applied directly to  the LM design. Two specific areas 
in which environmental conditions differed significantly were the vibration and the cold 
soaking of the four LM engine clusters.  Also, because LM propellant tanks were con- 
siderably longer than the SM tanks and the helium tanks were larger  in diameter,  the 
vibration test experience with the SM tanks could not be applied directly to the LM 
hardware. In these instances, the components were subjected to  environmental testing 
dictated specifically by the LM environments. 
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DES GN PHILOSOPHY 
To ensure reliable system performance, the design of the LM RCS was based on 
system and component redundancy - s imi la r  t o  the Mercury and Gemini spacecraft 
and to the Apollo CSM. Two independent and operationally identical LM RCS systems, 
each capable of providing attitude control and positive and negative longitudinal t rans-  
lation, were provided (fig. 2). The RCS propellant supply (nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer 
and Aerozine-50 fuel) consisted of predetermined quantities for  the lunar descent and 
ascent maneuvers. The tankage of each system was sized to contain one-half the RCS 
propellant required for  descent, plus the total RCS propellant required fo r  ascent. In 
addition, a contingency propellant supply was provided through an interconnect arrange- 
ment between the ascent propulsion system (APS) propellant tanks and the RCS mani- 
folds. The interconnect arrangement originally was meant to  be used only in an 
emergency situation. However, the interconnect arrangement was used as a normal  
operating mode during the powered-ascent phase to conserve RCS propellants for dock- 
ing contingencies. 
Within each pressurization system, redundancy was used for  such components as 
regulators, check valves, and explosive pressurization valves. The explosive valves 
were in a parallel configuration because the primary failure mode was in a closed posi- 
tion. The regulators were in a se r i e s  arrangement because the primary failure mode 
w a s  in an open position. The check valves were arranged in a ser ies-paral le l  configu- 
Helium pressure 
regulating package 
\Thrust chamber 
isolation valves 
LRCS manifold 
propellant transfer -I*:: +y 
crossfeed and 
ascent-engine 
valves - X  
Axes orientation System A 1 System B 
Ox. = oxidizer 
Figure 2. - Reaction control system 
installation. 
ration (1) because the failure probability in 
an open o r  closed position was considered 
to be about equal and (2) because the weight 
penalty associated with this particular com- 
ponent was minimal. Thus, no single func- 
tional failure could impair the control of 
the spacecraft o r  jeopardize crew safety 
because of propellant shortage. 
The co’mmon-use philosophy was ap- 
plied throughout the system design, using 
developed CSM components wherever pos- 
sible. Whenever the component could not 
be used directly, but could be made usable 
on the LM with minor modification, a 
common-technology approach was followed. 
The manufacturer of the SM part  was given 
the task of modifying his product t o  make it 
usable on the LM. Because this approach 
permitted the use of the same test  proce- 
dures, test equipment, and personnel em-  
ployed for  the SM, the resources  and 
learning t ime required to produce a given 
piece of hardware were minimized and, 
thus,  significant cost savings and increased 
confidence in reliability resulted. 
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DES I GN 
The LM RCS consisted of two independent systems, A and B. Each system pro- 
vided the vehicle with attitude control and X-axis translation when used independently. 
When used together, Z-  and Y-axis translation could be obtained also. The two sys tems 
were identical in all respects  other than the engine locations and thrust  vectors. 
Each system had an independent helium-pressurization module, propellant tanks, 
and propellant manifold (fig. 3).  The helium-pressurization module consisted of the 
helium storage tank, two parallel initiating explosive valves, a filter that protected the 
regulator, an orifice that acted as a damping device, a pressure regulator that reduced 
the initial storage pressure of 3000 psia to an operating level of 180 psia, a check valve 
assembly for each propellant (oxidizer and fuel) tank, and a relief valve assembly fo r  
each tank. The function of the check valves was to prevent backflow of fuel and oxi- 
d izer  vapors, which later could condense in a common area and reac t  to cause a local 
pressure and temperature rise. The function of the relief valves was to protect the 
propellant tanks from overpressurization in case of an increase in propellant tempera- 
ture o r  a regulator malfunction. Each system included a number of servicing and 
checkout test  ports. 
System B System A 
(PQMDI sensor (2) 
q: Propellant-quantity-measuring device Helium pressure vessel 121 
p -Pressure transducer (81 
-Helium initiating valve (4) 
Note: 
Valve positions (N.O., -Helium filter (21 
Ip m n I switch (161- 
Figure 3. - Reaction control system schematic. 
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The propellant tanks were of the positive -expulsion configuration. Each propel- 
lant w a s  contained inside a Teflon bladder that was in turn placed inside a titanium 
shell. Helium gas  entered the a r e a  between the titanium and the Teflon, forcing the 
propellant out of the bladder and into a perforated standpipe connected to the tank outlet 
port. 
The propellant manifold and distribution system is shown schematically in fig- 
ure  4. The position of the main, interconnect, fuel, and oxidizer valves controlled 
the propellant distribution to the engines. 
The valves were developed specifically 
for  the LM RCS applications because no 
component was available that could sat- 
isfy the requirements of every location. 
Each valve was a latching solenoid type, 
which required power only for opening 
and closing. After the desired position *ystemA 
was established, the poppet w a s  held in 
position by permanent magnets. The 
system conditions but were underdesigned 
fo r  dynamic conditions; therefore, the 
crewmen had to verify cor rec t  valve posi- 
tions during crit ical  phases of flight. With 
be used for any dynamic environment with- 
out creating a major system problem. 
Engine isolation 
valves were we l l  suited for nominal, static ;:iii:r stem B oxidizer 
fuel tank 
Oxidizer crossfeed 
valve proper crew procedures, the valves could va I ve 
Figure 4. - Propellant manifold and d is t r i -  
bution system schematic. 
In-line propellant f i l ters  originally 
were located downstream of the isolation 
valves. However, because the isolation valves were particularly sensitive to contami- 
nation (as discussed in detail later), the f i l ters  were relocated upstream as shown in 
figure 3.  
A redundant set of interconnect valves was provided. The valves ensured that, 
upon completion of the APS-interconnect operation during lunar ascent, the RCS pro- 
pellants would not be t ransferred to the empty APS tanks and that pressurant  gas  f rom 
the APS tanks would not be ingested into the RCS. These interconnect valves were nor-  
mally in the open position, and they were closed only if a malfunction was detected dur -  
ing the nominal APS-interconnect termination procedure. 
Flange Heater and Pressure Switch 
Two components developed specifically for  use with the LM RCS engines were  the 
engine flange heater  and the engine chamber pressure switch. 
Engine flange hea te r s .  - The engine flange heaters were required to maintain the 
temperature  of the engine combustion-chamber flange above 120" F. This temperature 
level, which w a s  determined during the engine-requalification program described later, 
was required t o  ensure safe operation of the engines with the Aerozine-50 fuel during 
all phases of the mission. Two heaters per engine were  provided to ensure redundancy. 
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Both heaters were operated by the automatic system, and one heater had a manual 
on/off override. 
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Engine chamber pressure  switch. - The engine pressure  switch was  used in con- 
junction with the failure-detection system of the LM. The electrical  signal f rom the 
guidance, navigation, and control system to  the engine valves was compared electron- 
ically with the output of the pressure  switch; and, if the two did not match, the engine 
failure indication was displayed to the crew. Corrective action such as engine isola- 
tion o r  troubleshooting in other systems then could be performed by the crew. 
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Installation of the  System 
The modular grouping of the propellant and helium storage components was made 
f o r  the purpose of simplifying the checkout and repa i r  procedures. Both operations 
could be performed "on the bench" without interfering with the overall vehicle opera- 
tions. The system was installed in two bay areas and on four outrigger booms. The 
tankage modules (helium, fuel, and oxidizer) were installed on the left- and right-hand 
s ides  of the LM directly above the APS tanks. The engines were installed in c lus te rs  of 
four on the outriggers, which were located around the periphery of the ascent stage at 
45"  t o  the orthogonal (pitch and roll) axes. Two of the four engines in each cluster 
were fed from each propellant supply. 
DEVELOPMENT AND CERTl FI  CAT1 ON 
The development and certification of the LM RCS consisted of nine major ground 
test programs. An overall RCS development schedule that includes the time phasing of 
the various programs and of the first six flights is shown in figure 5 .  A brief discus- 
sion of each major test program follows. 
Taskor flight I 1964 
~ 
iR -3  breadboard 
i R - 3  Droduction svstem 
. IR-~  besign ver i f ib t ion  test 
i R - l  
i R  -2  
upplemental engine qualificatioi 
'A-1 (series 21 
' A - l  lseries 81 
' A - l  (series 11 and 121 
n-house LM RCS test p r q r a m  
'roduction cluster 
:nginelheater integration 
:ngine valve high temperature 
\erozine-50 margin tests 
: m e n  propellant tests 
Wl cluster thermal tests 
LM-3 IApollo 91 
LM-5tApollo 111 
LM-1 IApOllO 51 
LM-4 IApollo 101 
LM-6 IApOllO 121 
LM-7 IApollo 131 
1111111 1111 
1965 
1111 
1969 
I 
I 
I 
' I  
I 
1970 
Figure 5. - Development and flight schedule. 
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Preproduct ion System Development Test Program 
The preproduction system development test program, o r  breadboard test, was 
the first test in which the proposed configuration of the LM RCS was hot fired. The 
t e r m  "configuration " is emphasized here  because the geometrical configuration of the 
propellant-feed plumbing, which was the most important test  item, w a s  about the only 
aspect of the test hardware that resembled actual flight hardware. With the exception 
of the very ear ly  prototype engines, the breadboard system was composed entirely of 
commercially available industrial-type components. 
In ear ly  1964, when the breadboard was being assembled, most flight components 
were still in ear ly  stages of development and were ra ther  scarce.  Most of the compo- 
nents were being developed under a common-usage agreement, and those few par t s  
made available to the LM program were being installed on the LM-1 vehicle and on 
major test vehicles. 
The breadboard testing was conducted by the RCS engine developer between Au- 
gust 1964 and May 1965. One of the primary objectives of the test program was to in- 
vestigate the dynamic character is t ics  of the propellant -feed system. The maximum 
pulse-frequency requirement for  the engines was 25 pulses/sec at a pulse duration of 
10 milliseconds. This high pulse frequency caused concern that the response of the 
relatively long propellant feedlines of the LM system was too slow to maintain adequate 
p re s su res  at the engine inlets during transient flow. Other objectives were to evaluate 
propellant -manifold priming procedures and engine performance during multiengine 
firings. Another important aspect of the program was to "shake down" the new LM 
test facility and data-acquisition equipment, which had been installed specifically for 
LM RCS development testing. 
The firing program consisted of single and multiengine firing matr ices  covering 
a wide range of pulse widths, pulse frequencies, and predicted flight duty cycles. The 
effects of pulse firings on the steady-state performance of another engine in the same 
system also were  investigated. Almost 15 000 separate firings totaling approximately 
8000 seconds of burn t ime were accumulated on the eight-engine system. 
Although the breadboard configuration hardly resembled a flight system, it pro- 
vided valuable data  much earlier than would have been possible if the test program had 
been dependent on the availability of flight-type hardware. The breadboard test pro-  
gram was completed almost a year  before the first flight-type configuration was avail- 
able for testing. 
One of the most significant findings of the test  program was that the feed- 
p re s su re  fluctuations during the short-pulse high-frequency firing were more severe  
than had been predicted analytically. In certain pulse modes, the transient engine- 
inlet p re s su res  dropped to levels as low as the propellant vapor pressure,  in  which 
case  no thrust  was produced by the engine. On the other hand, peak transient pressure  
generated at engine valve closure approached the proof -pressure requirements of some 
components. 
Fortunately, the detrimental effects of these severe  feed-pressure fluctuations 
were recognized in t ime to  avoid ser ious effect to the LM program. This information 
led to a complete reevaluation of the control system requirements for the LM and 
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helped to define the interface between the guidance system and the RCS. The signifi- 
cant result of the reevaluation was merely a change of the maximum pulse frequency 
from 25 to 7 pulses/sec. 
Another significant conclusion from the breadboard testing was that the planned 
technique f o r  filling o r  priming the propellant manifolds resulted in excessive transient 
pressures,  in some cases greater  than the design burst  pressure f o r  some flight com- 
ponents. The burst-pressure requirement fo r  most propellant-feed system components 
was 550 psia. During priming, with nominal operating tank pressures ,  transient pres-  
s u r e s  of almost 1100 psi  were recorded. These data resulted in modification of the 
planned flight-activation procedure from priming with full system operating pressure 
to  priming at tank pad pressure,  before activating the helium-pressurization system. 
Production System Development Test Program 
The second major test program, the production system development test pro- 
gram, was  conducted from August to November 1966, during the development of the 
LM RCS. This program was perhaps the most significant in the LM RCS development. 
The test r ig  was designated HR-3P. With the exception of additional instrumen- 
tation and minor modifications necessary to  facilitate ground test operations, the con- 
figuration of the HR-3P test r ig  was  almost identical to  that of the RCS on LM-1, the 
first flight vehicle. 
The basic objective of the test program was to  determine if the system could 
achieve fundamental design requirements. Most of the components in the test r ig  were 
prequalified or qualified models that had undergone extensive development tests as in- 
dividual components. However, HR-3P was the first r i g  that was assembled and tested 
as a complete system. 
To facilitate efficient test operations, the program was divided into a series of 
short  tests, each with a specific objective relating to  the various environmental or  
operational conditions that a flight system might experience during a lunar landing. 
Also, anticipated flight conditions were simulated whenever possible within the opera- 
tional limitations of the test facility and the imposed schedule requirements. All tests 
were performed at local barometric pressure,  which was approximately 12.5 psia. A 
large number of specific test objectives included the investigation of the following items. 
1. Helium -pressurization-system activation and propellant section priming 
2. System performance during simulated vehicle control modes and mission 
duty cycles 
3.  The effects of high and low temperatures on the performance of the system 
4. System performance during crossfeed and simulated interconnect operation 
5. Effectiveness of system-malfunction procedures and component redundancy 
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6. Component compatibility with propellants 
7. Decontamination techniques and fluids 
The HR-3P t e s t  r ig  also provided valuable experience in helium and propellant 
servicing. This  experience w a s  used in the design of the spacecraft ground-support 
equipment used at the launch site. 
The firing program consisted of single and multiengine firings under nominal 
and off -nominal conditions of propellant-feed pressures ,  engine valve voltages, and 
propellant temperatures.  Approximately 57 000 separate engine firings fo r  a total of 
approximately 8300 seconds of burn t ime were accumulated on the system engines dur-  
ing the program. 
Except for  the ra ther  routine operational problems with instrumentation and sup- 
port facilities that are usually expected during a complex and large-scale test opera- 
tion, the program ran ra ther  smoothly and was completed within a reasonable period 
of time. All test objectives were accomplished; that is, the capability of the system 
design to meet fundamental requirements was demonstrated and no insurmountable de- 
ficiencies were uncovered. The unique environment resulting from system operation 
did disclose salient character is t ics  of some components that were not compatible with 
all planned system operational modes. An outstanding example was  the discovery that 
the propellant latching valves would unlatch and shift position when subjected to  the high 
flow rates o r  pressure  surges  that occurred during initial filling o r  priming of the pro- 
pellant manifolds. This problem led to a very comprehensive investigation into the de- 
sign character is t ics  of the latching valve and revealed the true limitations of the valve. 
As mentioned previously, this valve problem was solved for flight by requiring the crew 
to ascertain cor rec t  valve positions during critical phases of flight. Other component 
problems discovered were (1) transducer diaphragm incompatibility with propellant 
combustion residuals  and (2) an inadequate seal design in the ground half of the 
propellant -servicing quick-disconnect couplings. 
The t e s t  program also substantiated the contention that the contamination control 
requirements and procedures for  the system were incompatible with the designs and 
reliability requirements of some components. Almost every system component and 
many facility components experienced leakage failures caused by particulate contami- 
nation. The propellant latching valve, because of a very narrow (0.006 inch) seat, was 
found to be particularly sensitive to contamination. The large number of leakage fai l -  
u re s  caused by particulate contamination provided support for a broad-based contami- 
nation control program, which is discussed in the section of this report  entitled "Lunar 
Module RCS Checkout of Flight Vehicles." 
Design Ver i  f icat i on  Development Test Program 
The third system-level test program was a design verification test (DVT) exe- 
cuted during February and March 1967. Whereas the objective of the previous produc- 
tion system test program was to determine the performance of the system under various 
conditions, the objective of the DVT program was considerably broader in scope. Not 
only was acceptable operation of the system demonstrated, but other factors  such as 
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manufacturing and checkout procedures, contamination control techniques, and propel- 
lant decontamination procedures used on flight systems were verified. All components 
in the DVT system were fully qualified models and were assembled into the same con- 
figuration as that of LM-3, the first manned vehicle. Also, the DVT system underwent 
the same manufacturing and checkout operations as the flight systems. 
The DVT program was essentially a repetition of some par t s  of the production 
system test program. High and low propellant-temperature tests, crossfeed opera- 
tion, and simulated failure-mode operation tests were conducted. Approximately 
23 200 engine fir ings were made, totaling approximately 3800 seconds of engine-burn 
time. 
Production Cluster Environmental Test Program 
The production cluster environmental test program demonstrated the structural  
integrity of the engine cluster and vehicle mounting hardware. Extensive shock and 
vibration t e s t s  in all major axes were conducted on a complete production flight-type 
engine cluster and boom assembly. 
With the exception of the failure of a chamber pressure  transducer bracket, the 
cluster design withstood all the mission-level random and sinusoidal vibration loads to 
which it was  subjected. Overs t ress  vibration levels of up to 200 percent of specifica- 
tion requirements also were imposed on the cluster without causing any significant 
structural failures. Failure of the transducer bracket resulted in a bracket redesign 
that was retrofitted on LM-1, the first flight vehicle. 
Lunar Module Production Cluster Firing Test Program 
The firings of a complete, flightworthy LM engine cluster (four engines) under 
simulated altitude conditions took place during the production cluster firing test pro- 
gram that w a s  conducted in April 1966. The pr imary objectives of the program were 
to evaluate engine performance under more realist ic flight conditions (particularly low 
ambient pressure)  and to determine the heat-transfer character is t ics  of the cluster 
during steady-state and pulse-mode duty cycles. The thermal  data  were to be inte- 
grated into the cluster thermal  tests that were being conducted in a thermal  vacuum 
facility that simulated the space environment. 
The fir ing program consisted of single and multiengine firings that simulated 
selected portions of expected mission duty cycles. In all, 1807 seconds of burn t ime 
and approximately 8500 firings were accumulated on the four engines in the cluster. 
On April 27, 1966, during the low-temperature mission duty cycle par t  of the 
program, the combustion chamber of the upfiring engine w a s  destroyed by an  explosion 
that occurred during the start of a pulse. This  failure resulted in the immediate ter- 
mination of the program and the initiation of an extensive failure-analysis effort. 
The analysis revealed that the failure was caused by a combination of conditions 
rather  than by one single cause. The upfiring attitude of the engine, low engine tem- 
peratures, helium saturation of the propellants, short-pulse firings, and relatively 
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high test-cell ambient p re s su re  were some factors found to  contribute to the accumula- 
tion of nitrate compounds, which could cause high ignition overpressures  and injector- 
manifold explosions. 
The engine failure brought about an extensive engine -requalification program but 
did not result  in any engine design changes. For the CSM application, the engine was 
qualified with monomethylhydrazine fuel. For the LM application, the requalification 
was done with Aerozine-50 because of the requirement for use of the same fuel for the 
LM RCS and APS. When the engine flange temperature was maintained above 120" F, 
engine failure was unlikely. The cluster heater design was changed to  ensure 120" F 
flange temperature. 
Integrated RCSlAPS PA-1 Test Program 
The PA-1 test r ig  was a flight-weight ascent-stage structure with only the RCS 
and APS installed. It was built principally for  development testing of the APS, and the 
RCS was included primarily fo r  evaluating the interconnect-propellant-feed mode. 
The configuration of the PA-1 RCS was similar to  that of test r i g  HR-3P and flight 
vehicle LM-1 except that solenoid valves were installed between the propellant tanks 
and the helium module to  prevent migration of propellant vapors into the regulators and 
check valves during extended downtimes. Also, additional feedline access  ports were 
installed between the cluster isolation valves and the engines to aid in draining 
propellant. 
All testing was conducted at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) during 
September and October 1966. A series of 11 runs was made under the altitude condi- 
tions (88 000 to  140 000 feet) attainable with the WSTF vacuum pumping system. Ap- 
proximately 3000 firings and 515 seconds of firing time were accumulated on 12 engines; 
the four upfiring engines were disabled t o  prevent possible injector-manifold explosions, 
which could occur at the relatively high test-cell pressure.  The high test-cell pressure 
was not a realistic simulation of space vacuum. 
Analysis of the data indicated that neither the RCS nor the APS experienced any 
detrimental effects during the interconnect-feed operation. A very minor decrease in 
RCS engine thrust, estimated to  be 1 to  2 percent, was observed while propellant was 
being supplied from the APS. This condition was attributed to slightly lower engine- 
inlet p re s su res  resulting from increased pressure loss  through the longer feedlines. 
The propellant pressure transients generated during RCS engine pulsing were found to 
have little o r  no influence on the performance of the APS engine. 
As in earlier system test programs, the lack of adequate contamination control 
was the only system-oriented problem that arose during the testing. Almost all the 
propellant latching valves in the system experienced internal leakage; and, before the 
testing began, all engines had to  be returned to  the manufacturer fo r  cleaning. 
A demonstration tes t  of a proposed flight procedure f o r  venting the RCS propellant 
manifolds of the nitrogen pad pressure by opening the engine valves at high altitude was 
unsuccessful. Gross  propellant leakage through either the interconnect valves o r  the 
main shutoff valves resulted in hot firings during the attempted manifold venting. As a 
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result  of th i s  test and numerous leakage failures of the latching valve, the LM-1 mani- 
fold venting operation was eliminated. 
The RCS testing on the PA-1 configuration was resumed with series 8, 11, and 
12 tests, starting in July 1968 and ending in May 1969. The major emphasis during 
PA-1 ser ies  8 testing was to  test the APS and RCS in support of the first manned flight 
(LM-3). The RCS engines were operated in normal-feed, crossfeed, and interconnected- 
feed modes. The systems installed in the PA-1 r ig  were essentially the LM-3 configu- 
ration. All tests were conducted at simulated altitude conditions. The test-cell 
pressure w a s  maintained below the 0.2-psia red-line value based on engine test expe- 
rience; therefore, the upfiring engines could be fired. Testing consisted of base-line 
engine performance tests with various propellant-feed modes, high-altitude start test- 
ing, and selected firing matrices designed to  evaluate the integration of the RCS and the 
caution and warning electronics assembly (CWEA). 
The primary conclusions from series 8 tests were as follows. 
1. The RCS performance in the various feed modes was acceptable. 
2. Safe RCS start capability and acceptable engine performance at high altitude 
(220 000 feet) were demonstrated. 
3. The NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center servicing procedures should be 
modified to include a continuous powering (open) of the main shutoff valves during 
priming of the RCS manifolds. All other priming and pressurization procedures were 
found to  be acceptable. 
4. Hydraulic interactions between the APS and RCS during interconnect feed 
caused minor fluctuations in the ascent-engine chamber pressure.  
5. The integrated RCS/CWEA performed satisfactorily. 
In series 11, RCS engines were operated in the interconnect-feed mode (APS pro- 
pellants) throughout the series to  simulate the ascent portion of the lunar mission. 
Testing consisted of a shakedown firing, an off -nominal lunar-landing-mission duty 
cycle to  evaluate the extent of RCS-induced fluctuations on the ascent-engine chamber 
pressure,  and subsequent heat-soakback tes t s  to simulate various failed RCS engine 
configurations. 
Series 11 testing indicated a potential problem with pressure rise of trapped pro- 
pellant in the inlet manifolds as a result  of thermal  soakback from a hot engine. In 
these tests, thruster-pair  isolation valves were closed and the RCS heater was turned 
off after RCS firing activity. In several  cases, engine heat soakback and the concomi- 
tant thermal expansion of the trapped propellants resulted in inlet p re s su res  up t o  the 
maximum allowed (700 psia in this test). The rate of pressure buildup showed that 
700 psia  would have been exceeded had the thruster-pair  isolation valves not been 
opened fo r  relief; consequently, the Apollo malfunction procedures incorporated p res -  
su re  relief steps - fir ing of one of the two isolated engines after isolation of an engine 
pair. 
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Series  12 testing consisted basically of a shakedown firing, a simulated ullage 
burn (in support of the LM-3 APS anomaly investigations), an off-nominal lunar-landing- 
mission duty cycle (high-frequency RCS pulsing), and subsequent heat-soakback tests. 
It was concluded from series 12 testing that high-frequency pulsing (up to 11 pulses/sec) 
of the RCS does not initiate CWEA thrust  chamber assembly (TCA) failure indications 
in either the normal- o r  interconnect-feed modes. Furthermore,  high-frequency puls- 
ing of the RCS does not seriously degrade engine performance, although the effect is 
grea te r  in the interconnect mode than in the normal-feed modes. 
I n-House LM RCS Test Program 
A complete LM RCS test was conducted at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center 
(MSC) in December 1967. The primary objectives of the tes t  were to define the general 
operational character is t ics  of the LM RCS under simulated altitude conditions and to 
obtain performance data  on individual subsystem components. This system test  was 
the first to  be conducted at simulated altitude conditions in excess  of 100 000 feet. 
The test art icle included all qualified components except the combustion-chamber 
p re s su re  switches. Most system components and all propellant lines had been used 
previously in tests on the HR-3 DVT system at the subcontractor's Magic Mountain 
Test Facility. The HR-3 DVT configuration was  modified and updated as required to  
satisfy specific test objectives and to  incorporate the latest changes to the flight sys -  
tem. The most important of these changes were as follows. 
1. Propellant-quantity-measuring devices were installed in each helium tank. 
2. One flight-type thrus te r  heater was  installed on each engine. 
3. A propellant filter was installed in  each engine injector valve. 
4. A pressure  switch (not flight configuration) was installed in each of 16 engine 
injector heads. 
5. Flight-type arc-suppression circuitry was installed on each engine. 
The test program included (1) pretest  operations, (2) base-line performance duty 
cycles, (3) simulated LM-1 and lunar-mission duty cycles, (4) special duty cycles de- 
signed to accomplish specific test objectives and evaluate system performance when 
subjected to  worst-case" duty cycles, and (5) post-test checkout and decontamination. 
The pr imary objectives of the test were satisfied; that is, data  on the general 
operational character is t ics  of the LM RCS and of the individual components were ob- 
tained. In the test program, three types of anomalies were observed. These anoma- 
lies, which were investigated and resolved, were propellant latch valve leakages, 
p re s su re  switch failures, and engine injector cooling below the 120" F lower limit. 
The propellant latch valve leakage was found to be caused by particulate contam- 
ination; therefore, the need f o r  system cleanliness w a s  emphasized. The switch fail- 
u r e s  were of two types - failed closed and failed open. The failed-closed condition 
was traced to the contamination of the switch mechanism by the semiliquid combustion 
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products. Such a failure would simply eliminate the usefulness of the switch but would 
not lead to a ser ious problem. The open failure was caused by a design deficiency that 
was  corrected on the flight configuration. The injector cooling problem was traced to  
the engine duty cycle. The problem was resolved during later tests when it was  shown 
that the normal mission duty cycles would not produce the cooling effect observed. 
Another significant finding was that, in general, the HR-3 DVT system compo- 
nents performed within specification limits after testing at the subcontractor's plant 
and storage fo r  several  months at MSC. Also, following the test program, the system 
performance was adequate to  complete a subsequent test program (LM-1 anomaly inves- 
tigation) after a 4.5-month exposure to an unknown and uncontrolled concentration of 
propellants . 
Heater I ntegration Tests 
After the engine was requalified with Aerozine-50 fuel at 120" F flange tempera- 
ture,  a complete cluster of four engines and eight engine flange heaters was subjected 
to  numerous firing duty cycles. In the test program, certain combinations of short  
pulses caused the engine flange to cool fas ter  than the heaters could warm it. In some 
cases, the cooling effect was so severe that the flange temperature dropped to below 
100" F, and an engine explosion finally resulted. Additional test runs were performed 
t o  identify the flange cooling regimes. It was recognized that many of the duty cycles 
tested were much more severe than the duty cycle expected in flight. However, be- 
cause the actual duty cycle in flight is highly unpredictable, it was necessary to  estab- 
l i sh  the safe operating regime. The result  was a map defining safe and unsafe engine 
operating duty cycles (fig. 6). Concurrent with the engine tests, additional mission 
simulations were performed to obtain a better estimate of the flight duty cycle. As 
can be seen in figure 6, the mission operating envelope (automatic mode) was found to 
be well within the safe region. The cooling effect was not a problem in the manual 
command mode because short-pulse combinations were not possible. 
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Figure 6. - Engine safe operating regimes. 
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Engine Valve Temperature Tests 
During the LM-3 mission, the temperatures recorded on the engine c lus te rs  ex- 
ceeded not only the predicted values but also the upper limit of the cluster instrumen- 
tation. A series of tests was conducted in April 1969 to define a maximum temperature 
to which the engine valves could be subjected without degradation of performance. The 
engine was tested at ever-increasing temperatures starting at 275' F and ending at 
375" F. The tests were terminated at 375" F when no degradation in performance was 
experienced. An instrumentation change (increase of upper limit to 260" from 200" F) 
also was made to  accommodate the expected operating temperature of the clusters.  
LUNAR MODULE RCS CHECKOUT OF FLIGHT VEHICLES 
The checkout of the LM RCS was divided into four basic categories of tests, which 
were conducted during the various stages of vehicle buildup. These were component 
tests, module tests, system-level tests, and vehicle-integration-checkout tests.  In 
general, all tests conducted on individual components at each level of checkout were 
the same. Also, most test and success  c r i te r ia  were patterned after the component 
predelivery acceptance tests, which were derived f rom the original procurement spec- 
ifications for  the component. The various checkout tests performed in the course of 
the vehicle buildup provided increased confidence in the system and permitted the t rack-  
ing of component performance from one test  t o  another so that any degradation could be 
detected easily. 
Component tes ts  were conducted at two locations, at the plant of the component 
manufacturer and at the point of assembly just  before installation into the vehicle. The 
preinstallation test  (PIT) was essentially a repetition of the checkout by the component 
manufacturer with some of the less important tes ts  eliminated. As the program pro- 
gressed and more experience and confidence were gained with the hardware, the scope 
of the PIT w a s  decreased gradually; and, in some cases ,  the test was eliminated 
entirely. 
The PIT was informal and consisted of proof-pressure tests, external and inter-  
nal  leak tests, cleanliness verifications, and functional checks. Each test was con- 
ducted according to a test plan o r  test outline that did not call  out each individual step 
of an operation, and these documents did not require the degree of quality control and 
inspection required by the higher level test procedures. This lack of formal  test 
procedures was the most significant flaw in the PIT operation and resulted in the in- 
troduction of particulate matter into some components, rupturing of numerous helium- 
relief-valve burs t  disks, and shorting of position indicator switches on the propellant 
latching valve. However, the PIT did eliminate many faulty units before they could be 
installed on the vehicle. 
The second level of checkout -the module level - was conducted on assemblies 
consisting of two o r  more components. Interconnecting brazed joints and plumbing 
were proof and leak tested, and the standard checks on individual components were  re- 
peated. The module-checkout concept increased the efficiency of the checkout opera- 
tions by substantially reducing the complexity of the procedures and the test  equipment. 
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For example, the elaborate and time -consuming precautions required to  prevent flexure 
of the propellant tank bladders during regulator and relief valve checkout were com- 
pletely eliminated in the helium-module checkout because this checkout was performed 
without the tankage module attached. The module -test concept also allowed flexibility 
in the checkout flow; that is, the various modules could be checked out independently 
without constraining other checkout functions. Other i tems checked as modules were 
cluster isolation -valve/f ilte r assemblies and the propellant manifolds. Tankage - module 
checkout consisted of bladder leak checks, unlatch current  measurement and leak tests 
of the main shutoff valves, and proof and leak tests of the brazed joints connecting the 
completely assembled and tested helium module to the tanks. Final instrumentation 
checks produced a complete tankage module ready for  installation on the vehicle. 
Concurrently with tankage -module checkout, the propellant manifolds were in - 
stalled and verified clean by a liquid Freon flush. This cleanliness test was conducted 
in two stages. The first par t  verified the plumbing between the outlet of the tankage 
module to  the inlet of the cluster filter, and the second par t  verified the cleanliness of 
the entire manifold up to the engine inlets. It should be pointed out that this liquid- 
flush cleanliness verification was incorporated only after a gaseous verification ap- 
proach proved to be totally inadequate. The effectiveness of the flushing procedure 
was enhanced further by simultaneous low level vibration of the plumbing. Leakage 
failures of engine valves and propellant latch valves were reduced drastically by the 
liquid -flush techniques. 
System-level tests consisted of manifold integrity tests, engine leak tests, and 
engine gas flow tests. Some helium-module components, which were susceptible to  
degradation by other functions o r  by time, also were retested. A rather  unique test 
tool called a If  calibrated feather' ' was used to verify, qualitatively, gas  flow through 
each individual propellant orifice in the engine injector head. Until th i s  device was 
developed, no method w a s  available to determine if the small  injector orifices were 
unobstructed. 
Vehicle integration tests, usually conducted just before vehicle shipment, verified 
the interfaces between the RCS and the other systems. Engine valve wiring and re- 
sponse, cluster heater current draw, and instrumentation were checked during the final 
phase of factory checkout. 
LUNAR MODULE RCS FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
The LM RCS performance on all Apollo flights was satisfactory. Several minor 
problems occurred, but satisfactory solutions were found for  all problems noted. The 
LM-1 and LM-3 flights indicated that the upper temperature limit of 190" F on the en- 
gine cluster was exceeded on numerous occasions with no deleterious effects. As pre- 
viously discussed, additional vendor tes t  data  demonstrated that the engine valves could 
be safely operated at a much higher temperature. Consequently, the limit was deleted 
on LM-4 and subsequent vehicles. 
Pressure switch "closed" failures occurred during the LM-3, LM-4, and LM-5 
flights, but these failures had no significant effect on the flights because the only con- 
sequence was the loss  of capability t o  detect an engine f'off" failure. The single 
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pressure switch "open" failure that occurred intermittently on LM-5 was considered to  
be a ser ious problem because an erroneous TCA failure indication resulted. This 
problem was solved on subsequent missions by briefing the crews about the possibility 
of an erroneous TCA flag. The switches were kept in the system primarily to aid flight 
controllers in the real-time analysis of control problems and RCS engine operation du r -  
ing the cri t ical  powered-descent mission phase. They were considered to be the best  
switches available f o r  this function but were not as reliable as the engine. A brief dis-  
cussion of the LM RCS performance on the Apollo 5, 9, 10, and 11 missions is provided 
in the following sections. 
Lunar Module 1 (Apollo 5 Mission) 
The unmanned Apollo 5 spacecraft, including the first flight-configuration LM, was 
tested successfully in ea r th  orbit on January 22 and 23, 1968. The primary objectives 
of the Apollo 5 mission were to flight verify the LM ascent and descent propulsion sys- 
tems  and the abort staging function for  manned flight. These objectives were accom- 
plished. The LM-1 RCS configuration differed from subsequent LM RCS configurations 
in several  areas of feed system design and instrumentation design. 
During the mission, the RCS performance and operation were nominal until con- 
t ro l  of the spacecraft was switched to  the guidance, navigation, and control system 
after abort staging (intentional separation of the ascent and descent stages of the LM). 
At that time, the vehicle m a s s  in the digital autopilot was configured fo r  control of a 
two-stage, fully loaded vehicle; consequently, the system was commanded t o  deliver 
propellant at a rate approximately 10 000 t imes greater than actually required. This 
anomaly caused the RCS to operate in several  off-limit conditions and resulted in f a i l -  
u r e s  in the system. Within 3.1 minutes, the system A propellant was depleted to 
27 percent, and that system was isolated to conserve propellant. System B continued 
at a rapid duty cycle until propellant depletion 5 minutes la te r ,  at which t ime helium 
started leaking through the collapsed system B fuel bladder. Satisfactory vehicle rates 
were restored by the system B thrust reduction (resulting from propellant depletion) 
and by the isolation of system A propellant tanks. While system B w a s  operating with 
two-phase oxidizer and helium-ingested fuel, the quad 4 upfiring engine failed. When 
system A was reactivated, the system A main shutoff valve on the oxidizer side inad- 
vertently closed. The ascent propellant interconnect valves were later opened, return- 
ing operation of the engines to normal until the interconnect valves were closed. The 
depletion of all propellant during the last minutes of the second ascent-engine firing 
allowed the spacecraft to tumble. Each of these specific RCS anomalies (i. e., the 
bladder, the engine, and the oxidizer main shutoff valve failures) was duplicated when 
a ground test system was exposed to  similar duty cycle and environmental conditions 
after the flight. 
The total propellant consumption from the RCS tanks was  approximately 
600 pounds. An additional 230 pounds of propellant were used from the APS tanks during 
interconnect operations. It is estimated that the RCS engines accumulated 1 6  000 fir- 
ings during the mission. All inflight LM-1 RCS problems were considered to  be a re- 
sult of the operational anomaly that caused the RCS to  operate in seve re  off-limit 
conditions. Therefore, no system design changes were made as a result of these 
problems. 
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Lunar Module 3 (Apollo 9 Mission) 
The Apollo 9 mission was the second to  include the LM and the first to  include a 
manned LM. The successful earth-orbital mission lasted approximately 241 hours 
f rom launch on March 3 to splashdown on March 13, 1969. The objectives of the mis- 
sion were as follows. 
1. Evaluate LM systems performance 
2. Evaluate LM functional capability 
3. Perform selected CSM/LM operations (rendezvous and docking) 
These objectives were accomplished. 
The LM RCS performed satisfactorily throughout the mission. The only problem 
noted was a failed-closed thrust  chamber p re s su re  (TCP) switch, which was used to 
monitor the quad 4 upfiring engine. 
The total propellant consumption from the RCS tanks was approximately 
353 pounds as measured by the onboard propellant-quantity -measuring devices. An 
additional 99 pounds were used from the APS tanks during interconnect operations. It 
is estimated that the RCS engines accumulated a total of 1250 seconds "on" t ime and 
20 000 firings during the mission. 
A significant decrease in the natural frequency of the LM RCS fuel and oxidizer 
manifold-pressure fluctuations was noted during interconnect-feed operations associ-  
ated with the APS burn to depletion. The decrease apparently was caused by either 
free helium entering the RCS manifolds from the APS o r  a higher saturation level of 
APS propellant relative to RCS propellant. In any event, the condition was not detri-  
mental to  RCS operation. 
Lunar Module 4 (Apollo 10 Mission) 
The Apollo 10 mission was the third to include the LM and the second to  include 
a manned LM. The successful lunar-orbital mission lasted approximately 192 hours 
from launch on May 18 to splashdown on May 26, 1969. The objectives of the mission 
were to demonstrate the satisfactory performance during a manned lunar mission of 
the crew, the space vehicle, and mission support facilities and to evaluate the LM per- 
formance in the cislunar and lunar environments. These objectives were accomplished. 
The LM RCS performed satisfactorily throughout the mission. The only problem noted 
consisted of five failed-closed T C P  switches. 
The total propellant consumption from the RCS tanks was  approximately 
557 pounds; however, only 276 pounds of the total were used during manned operations. 
An additional 42 pounds of propellant were used f rom the APS tanks during interconnect 
operations, It is estimated that the RCS engines accumulated a total of 1640' seconds 
"on" time and 20 000 firings during the mission. 
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Lunar Module 5 (Apollo 11 Mission) 
The Apollo 11 mission was the fourth to include the LM and the third to include a 
manned LM. The successful lunar landing mission lasted approximately 195 hours 
f rom launch on July 16 to splashdown on July 24, 1969. The pr imary purpose of the 
mission was to perform a manned lunar landing and to  return the crew safely to  earth.  
This  objective was accomplished. 
Performance of the LM RCS was satisfactory throughout the mission. The only 
problem noted involved two TCP switches. One of them was a failed-closed o r  "on" 
condition s imi la r  to the experience on previous flights. The total propellant consump- 
tion from the RCS tanks was approximately 319 pounds. An additional 69 pounds of 
propellant were  used from the APS tanks during interconnect-feed operations associated 
with lunar lift-off. It is estimated that the RCS engines accumulated a total of 1060 sec-  
onds "on" t ime and 1 2  000 firings during the mission. 
During an 18-minute period just  before terminal phase initiation, the quad 2 aft- 
firing engine switch failed to respond to seven consecutive minimum-impulse com- 
mands. This situation resulted in a mas ter  alarm and a TCA warning flag, which were 
reset quickly by the crew. Engine operation was nominal, and the switch failure had 
no effect on the mission. Subsequent c rews  were briefed that an erroneous TCA flag 
was possible and that, therefore, they should not abort unless the engine failure was 
verified by vehicle dynamics o r  some other means. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Successful completion of the ground-test program, coupled with excellent flight 
performance of the reaction control system, proved the system to be highly reliable. 
To a large extent, this high degree of reliability can be attributed to  the commonality 
philosophy applied to the command and service module and lunar module reaction con- 
t rol  system components. Another significant factor was the system and component 
cleanliness levels that were maintained by flushing and by providing in-line f i l ters  up- 
s t ream of cri t ical  components. 
The lunar module reaction control system did not experience significant design 
changes during development, qualification, o r  flight. This fact can be attributed pri-  
marily to  application of the common-use and common-technology philosophy. 
The engine injector valves proved to be extremely reliable. In the total program 
(both lunar module and service module), no engine injector valve leakage, as a result 
of engine operation o r  malfunction (explosion), was observed. The engine isolation 
valves, which were incorporated into the system to deal with the leaking engine valves, 
thus became of little value. It w a s  concluded that the valves were not essential  to crew 
safety, and the decision was made to delete them from the system in later flights to 
realize a 25-pound weight saving. 
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